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Leisy: Indian Law

COMMENT
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
THE EFFECT OF TRIBAL WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS ON
NON-INDIAN LANDS LOCATED
BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE
RESERVATION BOUNDARIES

L

INTRODUCTION

In City of Albuquerque v. Browner,l the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, in part, that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of the 1987
amendment to the Clean Water Act (CWA) was permissible
because the amendment is in accord with the doctrine of Indian
tribal sovereignty. 2 Specifically, the EPA interpreted the
amendment as allowing tribes to establish more stringent water quality standards than those imposed by states or the federal government. 3 In Section 1377 of the CWA, Congress did
not expressly grant tribes the power to set more stringent wa-

1. 97 F.3d 415 (lOth Cir. 1996).
2. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (lOth Cir. 1996) (per
McKay, with whom Henry and the Honorable Jenkins, B., Senior United States
District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation joined) (Hereinafter
"Albuquerque 11"). Petition for certiorari denied without comment, City of Albuquerque
v. Browner, 118 S.Ct. 410 (1997).
3. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423.
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ter quality standards. Section 1377 did, however, allow the
EPA to treat tribes like states.· States have the power to set
more stringent water quality standards than those created by
the EPA or by other states pursuant to section 1370 of the
CWA. 5 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribes were able

4. Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994) provides:
The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State for
purposes of Subchapter II of this chapter and sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315,
1318, 1319, 1324, 1329, 1341, 1342, and 1344 of this title to the degree
necessary to carry out the objectives of the section, but only if (1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the
management and protection of water resources which are held by an
Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a
member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust
restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation; and
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in
a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this chapter and of
all applicable regulations.
Such treatment as a State may include the direct provision of funds reserved
under subsection (c) of this section to the governing bodies of Indian tribes,
and the determination of priorities by Indian tribes, where not determined by
the Administrator in cooperation with the Director of the Indian Health '
Service. The Administrator, in cooperation with the Director of the Indian
Health Service, is authorized to make grants under subchapter II of this
chapter in an amount not to exceed 100 percent of the cost of the project. Not
later than 18 months after February 4, 1987, the Administrator shall, in
consultation with Indian tribes promulgate final regulations which specify
how Indian tribes shall be treated as States for purposes of this chapter. The
Administrator shall, in promulgating such regulations, consult affected States
sharing common water bodies and provide a mechanism for the resolution of
any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of differing water
quality standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes located on
common bodies of water.
Such mechanism shall provide for explicit
consideration of relevant factors including, but not limited to, the effects of
differing water quality permit requirements on upstream and downstream
discharges, economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality of
the waters subject to such standards. Such mechanism should provide for the
avoidance of such unreasonable consequences in a manner consistent with the
objective of this chapter.
5. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994), provides:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1)
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharge of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or
abatement of pollution; except that if an effiuent limitation, or other
limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard
of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political
subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effiuent
limitation, or other limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent than the effiuent
limitation, or other limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
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to set and enforce their own water quality standards through
their "residual sovereign powers."6 The Albuquerque court concluded that the powers enumerated in CWA section 1370 are
already guaranteed to tribes by inherent tribal sovereignty and
therefore do not need to be expressly incorporated into section
1377.7
In Albuquerque v. Browner, the appellate court unanimously affmned the district court's holdings, thereby rejecting
Albuquerque's claim that tribes cannot adopt or enforce water
quality standards that are more stringent than those set by the
EPA or approved for the state in which the tribe is located. 8 As
a result, states and cities located upstream from tribes that
negatively affect the attainment of more stringent tribal water
quality standards may be required to meet tribal standards
once approved by the EPA 9
Part II of this Comment briefly describes the background of
federal Indian law in the United States, including the jurisdictional disputes between federal, state, and tribal interests.
Part II also describes the EPA's Indian Policy to further illustrate the legal doctrines and policies that help shape current
judicial opinions. to Part III examines Albuquerque v. Browner,
in which the Tenth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of water
quality standards for the Pueblo of Isleta, an Indian tribe
whose reservation is located downstream from Albuquerque's
wastewater treatment plant on the Rio Grande River.11 This
section illustrates the EPA's proper interpretation of the CWA,
within the context of inherent tribal sovereignty, and subse-

standards, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States
with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.
6. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423 n.12 (defining residual sovereign powers as
those self-governing rights that tribes retain because Congress has not expressly
eliminated them), citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding
that Indian tribes can use their water rights, which are an element of tribal
sovereignty, to assert an action against upstream polluters to recover damages for
groundwater contamination).
7. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423.
8. See id. at 423-424, 429.
9. See id.
10. See discussion infra part II.
11. See discussion infra part III.
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quent EPA regulations that may force upstream polluters to
comply with a downstream tribe's water quality standards.
Part IV discusses Albuquerque, the Ninth Circuit's more recent
decision in Montana v. EPA,12 and the effects of tribal environmental regulation of non-member activities on non-Indian fee
land located either within or outside Indian reservations. 13
Montana is the only other appellate court decision addressing
the issue of EPA authorization empowering Indian tribes to
establish water quality standards. 14 Part V critiques the
emerging trend of decisions upholding the EPA's approval and
enforcement of more stringent tribal water quality standards
on upstream polluters as well as non-members on fee land
within a reservation. Part VI concludes that the EPA reasonably interpreted the plain language of the CWA and Supreme
Court precedent when implementing their regulations to determine when· tribes should be permitted, under Section
1377(e), to promulgate water quality standards. 15
II.
BACKGROUND OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW BETWEEN TRIBES, STATES AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Since Europeans first arrived in North America, most legal
disputes involving American Indian tribes and whites have
concerned restrictions on tribal sovereignty within America's
federal system of government. 16 The United States Supreme

12. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
13. See Roger H. Bernhardt, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS at 76-80 (1999).
The term "fee land" is used in a general sense without distinction for land which may
be held in Fee Tail or Fee Simple, but including the common law rights to possess and
use the land as the landowner sees fit while also retaining the right to will the land to
one's heirs. Id.
14. See Albuquerque II; Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
15. See Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
16. See e.g. Daniel LS.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards
Dispute: Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Autlwrity Over Non-Indian Reservation
Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 152 (1995-1996) (citing Charles F. Wilkinson,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987»; See also DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, 2-7, (3d ed. 1993) (using "sovereignty" to refer to a tribe's right or power to
self-govern).
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Court first established the concepts of tribal sovereignty
through three cases known as the "Marshall Trilogy."!7
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND TRIBAL
STATE JURISDICTION DISPUTES

To justify the United States government's control over Indian nations, the U.S. Supreme Court established what many
Indian legal scholars consider the foundation of American federal Indian law. IS The "Marshall Trilogy," named after then
Chief Justice John Marshall, established the legal foundations
for resolving sovereign jurisdictional disputes between American Indian tribes, states, and the federal government. 19 These
cases relegated indigenous peoples of the "New World" to the
status of dependent nation-states to which the United States
owes a trust responsibility.20
The first of the Marshall Trilogy cases, Johnson v.
M'Intosh,2! addressed the authority of Indian "chiefs" to grant
titles of land in possession of their tribe to non-Indians. 22 The
Court determined that while Indians retained possessory
rights over their land, European "discovery" gave the federal
government the exclusive right to extinguish this Indian title of
occupancy by purchase or conquest.23 Using this "doctrine of
discovery," the Court reasoned that European-originated na-

17. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1843); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4TH ed. 1998).
19. But see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's
Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 6,358-69 (1992), reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 16, at 35-37 (pointing
out that the colonization of one race of peoples by another inevitably establishes a legal
system of racial discrimination against the colonized race. Therefore, by citing to the
"Marshall trilogy" as the basis of federal Indian law, courts and scholars perpetuate a
racist legacy of using law as a tool of racial domination against indigenous peoples and
their rights of self-determination).
20. See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 74 (providing a comprehensive history of
federal Indian law). See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The
New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF L. REV. 1573
(December, 1996).
21. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1843).
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 550.
23. See id. See also GETCHES, supra note 16. at 69.
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tions maintained superior rights over lands occupied by "infidels, heathens, and savages," and encouraged white settlers to
acquire the Indian "waste" lands. 24 Thus, Johnson was the fIrst
decision to engrain into the fabric of American federal Indian
law the idea that Indian peoples could be denied rights that
were otherwise provided to the nations of Europe. 25
In the second case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,26 the Cherokees sought an injunction prohibiting Georgia from enforcing
certain laws upon their reservation lands. 27 The Court addressed the issue of whether the Cherokee Nation constituted a
foreign, independent, and sovereign nation state, existing separate and apart from the United States government. 28 The
Court ruled that Indian nations were not foreign nations but
rather "domestic dependent nations."29 The Court reasoned
that although tribes had treaty making powers, they looked to
the United States government for protection and were therefore "completely under the sovereignty and dominion" of the
federal government. 30 Justice Marshall found that the federal
government had exclusive power over Indian tribes, and analogized the relationship as "a ward to his guardian."3l Thus, the
Court created the assumption that tribes were dependent on
the United States government to protect their lands from foreign invasion. 32

24. See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 81.
See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating that Johnson provided a legal
framework for extinguishing Indian title that was used to acquire the lands of the
United States).
26. 30 U.s. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
27. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2.
28. See id. at 4, 18.
29. Id.at17.
30. Id.
31. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The notion of the federal
government's relationship to Indian tribes as that of "a ward to his guardian" was later
expressed as the trust responsibility doctrine. See e.g. United States v. Mitchell
(Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (stating that statutory duties may render the federal
government liable to tribes for violation ofthe trust responsibility).
32. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1578 n.18
(December, 1996) (noting that this theory is criticized because many Indian tribes were
more numerous and powerful than the Europeans during the early days of colonization.
The author asserts that the major threat to Indian tribes was from European
25.
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Finally, in Worcester u. Georgia,33 the Court held that a
tribe's dependent status did not extinguish its preexisting
tribal powers to govern internal tribal affairs within reservation boundaries. 34 The issue in Worcester was whether the
State of Georgia's laws could supercede the Cherokee Nations'
laws to convict a white missionary for residing within the limits of the Cherokee reservation without a license from the State
of Georgia.35 The Court held that only the federal government
may infringe upon tribal authority on reservation lands. 36 In
the Court's analysis, Justice Marshall conceded that Indian
people were distinct peoples, divided into separate nations, independent from each other and the rest of the world with their
own laws.37 Driven primarily by his federalist convictions, Justice Marshall's decision explicitly established the supremacy of
federal power over state power in the area of Indian affairs. 38
Thus, Worcester prevented state infringement on Indian lands
by strengthening the doctrine of federalism so that it preserves
tribal sovereignty, subject only to abridgment by the federal
government.39
As a result of the Marshall trilogy and other more recent
cases, federal law generally prohibits states from exercising
regulatory authority on Indian lands unless Congress has

encroachment onto their lands. Therefore, protection was needed from colonialism
rather than foreign military invasion).
33. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. The Court noted: "The Cherokee
nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress." [d.
35. See id. at 531.
36. See id. at 594.
37. See id. at 542,543.
38. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1582 (asserting the triumph of tribal
government over Indian country was made possible by the presumption that tribal
sovereignty was only subject to the legislative authority of the United States. Justice
Marshall found support for this presumption in the Indian Commerce Clause, u.s.
CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 3, which granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes). See also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
39. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-59.
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authorized such action. 40 Nevertheless, the rules established
by the Marshall cases continue to be criticized by many Indian
legal scholars as unjustly asserting congressional power over
Indian affairs based on a self-legitimating colonialist theory.·l
Despite such criticism, the Marshall trilogy was remarkable for
its time because it recognized tribal autonomy by significantly
limiting state powers over Indian lands. 42
B.

MODERN ADJUDICATORY DOCTRINES REGARDING TRmALSTATE JURISDICTION DISPUTES

The Supreme Court's principles for the adjudication of
tribal-state jurisdictional disputes have fluctuated significantly
since Chief Justice Marshall's time. 43 For over a century, the
Court was faithful to the principles set out in the Marshall trilogy and consistently held that, although the United States federal government can abrogate tribal powers, it can only do so
through legislation. 4• However, the Supreme Court's principles
for resolving jurisdictional disputes in the twentieth century
have departed from this precedent and are described by legal
scholars as the "Modem Era" (1959-1980) and the "Subjective
Era" (1980-present).45

40. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221·222
(1987) (holding that the State of California's regulation of tribal bingo enterprises
would impermissibly infringe on tribal government).
41. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (discussing the
continued debate among Indian legal scholars over the morality of federal Indian law
(or American law as applied to Indians), and its roots in conquest and discovery which
serve to falsely legitimate congressional plenary power and Congress' ability to alter
the powers of Indian tribes). But see Getches, supra note 32, at 1581 ("It is too late in
the day to revisit two centuries of consistently and firmly reiterated precedent or to
expect a basic reformation of the historical legal relationship of the United States to
Indian tribes").
42. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1581 n.24.
43. See e.g., Rey.Bear, supra note 16, at 224 n.29 ("On the larger issue of tribal
status within the United States, Congress has expressed quite varying views of tribal
sovereignty while the courts have taken an increasingly dim view of it").
44. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1630.
45. See GETCHES, supra note 16. See also Getches, supra note 32, at 1574 n.4.
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1.
The Strengthening of Foundational Principles in the
"Modern Era"
During the Modern Era, from 1959-1980, the majority of the
Supreme Court's decisions reflected the premise established in
the Marshall trilogy, that state power was prevented from encroaching upon tribal sovereignty unless Congress provided
express permission through legislation. 4s In Williams v. Lee,47
the first case of the Modern Era, a unanimous Supreme Court
held that state courts had no jurisdiction over a civil claim filed
by a non-Indian against an Indian for a contract entered into
on the Navajo reservation. 4s In Williams, the Court stated that
allowing state jurisdiction over such claims would undermine
the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs, thereby
infringing on the right of Indians to govern themselves. 49 Thus,
the Court continued to view reservation boundaries as barriers
to state regulation absent congressional action to the contrary.50
Another Modern Era case, McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission,51 served to strengthen traditional notions of
tribal self-government. 52 In McClanahan, the Court held that
Arizona could not tax an individual Navajo's earned income
because she had earned it exclusively from reservation
sources. 53 The Court reasoned that, since the Navajo reservation was established by the federal government for the exclusive use and occupancy of Navajo people, they retained sovereignty over their lands, free from the State's intrusion. 54 The
McClanahan Court was the first to define this approach to Indian jurisdiction cases as one of reliance on federal preemp-

46. See Getches, supra note 32, at 163l.
47. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
48. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (finding that state law was
permitted only where "essential tribal relations" are not involved).
49. See id. at 223.
50. See id.
51. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
52. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
53. See id. at 18l.
54. See id. at 174-175.
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tion. 55 Under federal preemption analysis, courts focus on the
federal statutes and treaties at issue while recognizing tr~di
tional notions of tribal self-government in Indian country. 56
Thus, preemption analysis under McClanahan favors tribal
sovereignty unless it is usurped by congressional action. 57

Williams and McClanahan are just two examples of the Supreme Court's decisions during the Modem Era that served to
uphold the traditional principles found in the Marshall trilogy.58 The Supreme Court's adherence to the traditional principle that tribal sovereignty exists subject only to Congressional modification was due primarily to the presence of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun on the COurt. 59 . However, the current Supreme Court has strayed from traditional
notions of inherent tribal sovereignty toward a subjective view
that attempts to balance the interests of Indians and nonIndians. This approach may subject tribes to state controls
without Congressional action. 60

55. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1590 (illustrating that the Indian sovereignty
doctrine continued to play a central role in McClanahan although demoted to a
"backdrop" against which the relevant treaties and statutes must be read).
56. See generally McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164. However, the Court also noted that
since few federal statutes are clear regarding state jurisdiction, a court must determine
whether Congress's intent was to pre-empt state jurisdiction by looking at the
language, legislative history, or circumstances of their enactment. Thus, a court can
consider the state's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non·Indians on
reservations. See id. at 17l.
57. See id.
58. See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983)
(holding that New Mexico was preempted from regulating hunting and fishing by nonIndians on trust lands within the reservation because the tribe and federal government
had extensively regulated these rights). See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
389 (1976) (granting tribal jurisdiction over child placement proceedings for any child
who resides on the reservation or is a ward of the tribe).
59. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1630·163l.
60. See id. at 1630-1631 (noting that only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens have demonstrated serious interest in Indian cases although neither adheres
to the traditional view that the judiciary should leave modifications of tribal
sovereignty to Congress).
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2.
The Degradation of Foundational Principles in the "Subjective Era"
While the current United States Supreme Court, led by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, has not openly rejected the traditional
principle that tribal· sovereignty survives until curtailed by
Congress, the Court has, nonetheless, given great deference to
non-Indian interests in reservation jurisdictional disputes over
the past seventeen years. 61 Swayed by arguments that effects
on non-Indians would be severe if tribal sovereignty were upheld, the Rehnquist Court frequently departs from the traditional foundations of Indian law. 62

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 63 was the first Subjective Era Supreme Court case to substantially deviate from traditional principles of. Indian law. 64 The· Oliphant Court held
that tribal authorities lack criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians for crimes committed on reservations. 65 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that tribal exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants would subject
them to an unfair system of justice.66 However, the Court ex-

61. See id. at 1574 (citing, in part, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995); Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S.
61 (1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, 447 U.S. 134 (1980».
62. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1594. "The new tendency in the Court's tests,
rules, and rhetoric is to define tribal powers according to policies, values, and
assumptions prevalent in non-Indian society." [d.
63. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
64. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See also Getches,
supra note 32, 1595-1599.
65. Oliphant, 435 U.s. at 212.
66. See id. at 210-211. Two non-Indians were arrested on various criminal
charges including assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. The
Tribe attempted to try the non-Indians in tribal court according to its Law and Order
Code, which extended tribal jurisdiction over both Indians and Non-Indians. [d. The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in criminal cases tribes do not have inherent
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court based its decision, in part, on the fact that
non-Indians were excluded from Suquamish Tribal court juries, therefore potentially
infringing on the due process rights of non-Indians. [d. at 194-195. But see Getches,
supra note 32, at 1597 n.98 (noting that the record in Oliphant did not reflect any
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plicitly stated that its ruling restricted only tribal criminal jurisdiction, thereby leaving "untouched the tribes' more important civil jurisdiction over non-lndians."67 Oliphant is significant because it reflects the Rehnquist Court's willingness to
protect non-Indian interests over Indian sovereignty.68
Three years after Oliphant, the Rehnquist Court extended
its subjective approach to preclude tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians on non-Indian fee land within a reservation. In Montana v. United States,69 the Supreme Court held that the Crow
Indian Tribe lacked authority to regulate non-members' hunting and fishing on non-Indian owned land within the Crow reservation boundaries. 70 The Montana Court's denial of tribal
authority over non-members was based, in part, on the Court's
subjective view that regulation of non-members' hunting and
fishing activities on non-Indian lands located within a reservation did not bear a clear relationship to tribal self-government
or internal relations. 71 In reaching its decision, the Court cited
Oliphant for the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of
the tribe. 72 Nonetheless, the Montana Court created two exceptions to its rule. First, a tribe may retain jurisdiction over nonIndians engaged in consensual relationships through contracts,
leases, or other arrangements with a tribe or its members. 73
Second, and most important in the area of environmental
regulation, a tribe may exercise civil jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the "political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe. "74 Some commentators believe that this second ex-

pattern of discrimination or abuse of the rights of non-Indians by the tribe and that the
Court's protection of non-Indian interests is not necessary as Congress has plenary
power over tribes.)
67. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 n. 7. See also Getches, supra note 32, at 1598.
68. See generally Getches, supra note 32, at 1599 (noting that when a case did not
involve the liberty or property of non-Indians, tribal sovereignty was upheld).
69. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
70. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-567 (1981).
71. See id. at 564.
72. See id. at 565.
73. See id. at 566-67.
74. [d.
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ception leaves the fate of tribal sovereignty up to the subjective
evaluations of future courts. 75
While the Rehnquist Court's subjective trend has not totally
usUrped traditional principles, three themes have emerged. 76
First, the Court has stepped back from established methods of
interpreting Indian sovereignty rights. 77 Second, nineteenthcentury policies of assimilation and allotment are sometimes
cited as justification for limiting Indian autonomy.78 Third, the
Court has presumed the right of balancing non-Indian interests
against tribal interests so that tribal sovereignty comports with
the Court's own idea of what it should include. 79 Nevertheless,
a return to the bedrock principles of Indian law is occurring
through congressional legislation authorizing federal agencies
like the EPA to enact regulations allowing tribes to exercise
authority over non-member activities that have a serious and
substantial impact on the health and welfare of the tribe. 80
C.
OVERVIEW OF THE EPA's INDIAN POllCY AND THE CLEAN
WATER ACT

The EPA encourages tribal self-determination through both
the administration of the CWA and its "Indian Policy. "81 These
two EPA functions foster the expansion of tribal involvement in
EPA program implementation. This policy empowers tribes

75. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1610.
76. See id. at 1620.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1620·1630.
80. See generally the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2) (1994); the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1377(e) (1994), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
42 U.S.C. 30Oj.ll(b)(l) (1994) (provisions providing Treatment as a State (TAS) status
to qualifying tribes, thereby allowing tribes to make individual fact·based findings
showing that the activity sought to be regulated would present a serious and
substantial threat to the health, safety or welfare of the tribe). See also discussion
infra part II.C.
8l. See EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian
Reservations (November 8, 1984) (Internal EPA Policy Memo on file with author)
[hereinafter the "Indian Policy").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2

152 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:139
with as much authority as states to protect the natural resources and the health and welfare of their peoples. 82

1.

The EPA's Indian Policy And Tribal Self-determination

In November of 1984, the EPA implemented a policy called
the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (hereinafter the "Indian Policy").83 In this policy, the
EPA states that its fundamental objective is to protect the human health and environment on Indian reservations. 84 The
policy also emphasizes tribal self-determination and the establishment of official relationships between federal and tribal
governments.85 Under the Clinton administration, the EPA
reaffIrmed the Indian Policy and proposed the creation of a national Indian Program Office to encourage the expansion of
tribal involvement in EPA program implementation. 86
The EPA's Indian Policy contains nine mission statements
with a brief description of each. 87 First, the EPA is ready to
work with Indian tribal governments on a direct basis, rather
than as subdivisions of other governments. 88 Second, the EPA
recognizes ''tribal governments as the primary parties for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions, and
managing programs for reservations, consistent with agency

82. See e.g. Lynn H. Slade and Walter E. Stern, Environmental Regulations on
Indian Lands-A Question of Jurisdiction, http://www.lectlaw.com/fileslenv21.
83. See the Indian Policy.
84. See id. at 1.
85. See id.
86. See e.g. Lynn H. Slade and Walter E. Stern, Environmental Regulations on
Indian Lands-A Question of Jurisdiction, http://www.lectlaw.com/fileslenv21 (citing
59 Fed. Reg. 13820 (March 23, 1994) and 59 Fed. Reg. 38460, 38461 (July 28, 1994».
The authors declare the EPA a strong proponent of tribal environmental regulation
and predict that, as a result, tribes will develop their own regulatory programs under
federal environmental statute~ventually obtaining regulatory primacy under these
federal laws. See id. at 2.
87. See the Indian Policy at 2-4.
88. See id. at 2. "EPA recognizes tribal governments as sovereign entities with
primary authority and responsibility for the reservation populace." Id. Thus, the EPA
seeks to work directly with tribal governments as the primary authority for reservation
affairs, rather than as political subdivisions of states or the federal government. See
id.
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standards and regulations. "89 Third, the EPA vows to "take
affirmative steps to encourage and assist tribes in assuming
regulatory and program management responsibilities for reservation lands. noo Fourth, the EPA will take steps "to remove
existing legal and procedural impediments to working directly
and effectively with tribal governments on reservation programs."91 Fifth, in keeping with the federal trust responsibility
doctrine, the EPA "will assure that tribal concerns and interests are considered whenever EPA's actions and/or decisions
may affect reservation environments. n92 Sixth, the "EPA will
encourage cooperation between tribal, state, and local governments to resolve environmental problems of mutual concern. "93
Seventh, the EPA will work with other federal agencies that
have similar responsibilities to cooperate in helping tribes assume environmental program responsibilities on reservations. 94

89. [d. Since the EPA's deliberation policies have usually involved the interests
and/or participation of state governments, the EPA will look directly to tribal
governments to play the lead role for matters affecting reservation environments. See
id.
90. [d. The EPA pledged to work with interested tribal governments to develop
programs that help them assume regulatory authority for reservation lands and
resources. Aid will be made available to qualifYing tribes and may include providing
grants and other assistance that is similar to those provided to state governments.
However, until tribal governments are willing to assume full responsibility for
managing programs, the EPA will retain authority. See id.
91. [d. The EPA noted that a number of serious constraints and uncertainties
exist in the language of environmental statutes that inhibit the Agency's ability to
work directly with tribes. Thus, the EPA pledged to remove these impediments, with
tribal input, as they are discovered. See id.
92. The Indian Policy at 3. The EPA recognized the trust responsibility doctrine
historically derived from the relationships between the federal government and tribes
as expressed in treaties and federal Indian law. Thus, the EPA endeavors to protect
the environmental interests of Indian tribes when carrying out its responsibilities
regarding issues that may affect reservation environments. See id.
93. [d. The EPA stated that sound environmental planning requires the
cooperation of neighboring governments, whether they are neighboring states, tribes or
local governments.
Thus, the EPA will encourage early communication and
cooperation between all interested parties. However, this policy does not lend federal
support to anyone party to the jeopardy of the interests of the others. Rather, it
recognizes that, in environmental regulation, problems are often shared and
cooperation helps·benefit all parties involved. See id.
94. See id. The EPA seeks to promote cooperation between federal agencies to
protect human health and the environment on reservations. The EPA will work with
other agencies to clearly identify and delineate the roles, responsibilities, and
relationships of the respective organizations to assist tribes to develop and manage
environmental programs for reservation lands. See id.
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Eighth, the EPA "will strive to assure compliance with environmental statutes and regulations on Indian reservations. "95
Finally, the EPA will absorb these Indian policy goals into its
planning and management activities, including its budget, operating guidance, legislative initiatives, management accountability and ongoing policy and regulation development processes. 96
The EPA has adopted these mission statements into its
planning and management activities since 1984. 97 In addition,
it has used its legal authority to approve tribal water quality
standards on Indian reservations. 98 For example, one EPA
statement made in support of its decision to approve a tribe's
water quality standards noted that: "In keeping with the principle of Indian self-government, the EPA policy provides that
tribal governments are the primary parties for setting standards ... and managing programs for reservations. Moreover,
federal courts have approved the EPA's decisions to grant Indian Tribes the same degree of autonomy to determine the
quality of their environment as was granted to the StateS."99
Thus, the EPA refuses to place a limit on tribal water quality

95. [d. at 4. When facilities owned or man,lged by tribal governments ,_~e not in
compliance with federal environmental statutes, the EPA }Jkclf,<:" le, ""'.,rk cooperatively
with tribal leadership to develop means to achieve compliance. 1.\ •. ·:.:ri.hdcss, dir~ct
EPA action through the judicial or administration process will be considprC"; ":~eT'_' the
Agency determines, in its judgment, that: "(1) a significant threat to human health or
the environment exists; (2) such action would reasonably be excepted to achieve
effective results in a timely manner, and (3) the federal government cannot utilize
other alternatives to correct the problem in a timely fashion." [d. Yet, when the
reservation facilities are clearly owned or managed by private parties, the Agency will
generally respond to noncompliance as it would by the private sector elsewhere in the
country. See id.
96. See id. The EPA sought "to ensure that the principles of this policy are
effectively institutionalized by incorporating them into the Agency's ongoing and longterm planning and management processes." [d.
97. See the Indian Policy at 1.
98. See e.g., Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Staruiards, Are There Any
Limits?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 367, 381 (1997).
99. [d. at 378 n.89 (quoting an EPA statement made in support of the Proposed
Water Quality Standards for the Colville Indian Reservation in the State of
Washington). See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (1998).
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standards, asserting that since states are not limited in their
strictness of standards, tribes should also not be limited. 100

2.

Treating Tribes as States Under the Clean Water Act

Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA) to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters" through the reduction and eventual elimination of the discharge of pollutants into those waters. 101 While
the CWA is a federal statute, its implementation involves congressional and executive delegation of enforcement programs to
the states. 102 To reach its goals, the CWA mandates a partnership between the federal government and the states, giving the
states "primary responsibilities and rights" to regulate water
pollution. 103
Congress provided that the EPA may treat tribes as states
under the CWA if the EPA promulgates regulations "which
specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as states," and if the
Administrator fmds that the tribe fulfills certain specified requirements. 104 First, the CWA requires that the Indian tribe
have a governing body that carries out substantial duties and
holds substantial powers. 105 Second, the tribe's proposed actions must pertain to the management and protection of water
resources within the tribe's jurisdiction or otherwise within the

100. See Baker, supra note 98, at 376 n.89 (noting that the EPA claimed that there
was no sign that Congress intended to treat tribes as "second class" states under the
CWA). See also 40 C.F.R. § 131 (1998).
101. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
102. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994). This section provides:
It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter. [d.
103. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
104. See supra note 4 and accompanying text, CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e)(I) (providing possible TAS status if an Indian Tribes has a governing body
that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers; functions would pertain
to the management and protection of water resources held by the Tribe; and the
Administrator deems the Tribe capable of carrying out the functions proposed).
105. See id. A governing body with substantial duties and powers may include a
tribal council that passes legislation and votes on proposals. See also 40 C.F.R. 131.8
(1998).
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borders of the reservation. 106 Third, the Administrator must
regard the tribe as capable of carrying out the functions of all
applicable regulations consistent with the statute and other
applicable regulations. 107
EPA's regulations also set out procedural requirements to
which Indian tribes must adhere when applying for treatment
as a state (TAS) status. lOS Tribes must submit a detailed application to the EPA Regional Administrator showing that the
tribe satisfies the prescribed criteria for TAS status. 109 The
Administrator provides notice of the application to all appropriate governmental entities and allows 30 days for the submission of comments. 110 If public comments challenge a tribe's
authority, the Regional Administrator determines whether the
tribe meets the requirements of the CWA. 111 These requirements were created to ensure the due process rights of all interested parties. 112
The implementation of federal environmental statutes in
Indian country, through TAS provisions, is based on Congressional delegation to the EPA. 113 In turn, the EPA delegates
significant powers to qualified Indian tribes on a tribe-by-tribe
basis. 114 Thus, under the CWA, a tribe's water quality standards could potentially affect the activities of non-members on
fee lands, both within or outside a reservation's exterior
boundaries. 115 At least two tribal groups have succeeded in obtaining TAS status and have overcome judicial challenges to

106. CWA 33 U .s.c. § 1377 (e)(2). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
107. CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (e)(3). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
108. See generally 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (b)(c) (1998).
109. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (b).
110. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (c)(3).
111. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8(c)(4).
112. See generally 40 C.F.R. 131.8.
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
115. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423; See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135
(9th Cir. 1998).
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the EPA's authority to empower them to establish water quality standards. 116
III.
ALBUQUERQUE v. BROWNER: JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF EPA REGULATIONS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF DOWNSTREAM TRIBAL WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
was the first appellate court to consider the issue of tribal
authority to set water quality standards.ll7 The court found
that the EPA's authorization of the Pueblo Tribe to establish
water quality standards for purposes of the CWA was "in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty." 118
Thus, the court upheld EPA enforcement of the Tribe's more
stringent downstream water quality standards against the City
of Albuquerque. 119
A

FACTS AND PRoCEDURAL HISTORY

The Rio Grande River flows from north to south through
New MexIco, then turns east to form the border between Texas
and Mexico. 12O The City of Albuquerque, located in New Mexico, discharges treated wastewater eftluent into the Rio
Grande. 121 This discharge travels five miles downstream to the
Isleta Pueblo Indian Reservation, which is located on the eastern side of the river.l22 Plaintiff, the City of Albuquerque, acquires its water from two wells which draw on an aquifer hav-

116. See generally Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429 (challenging the EPA's approval
of the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards). See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at
1142 (constituting a facial challenge to the EPA's regulations authorizing TAS status to
the qualifying Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes).
117. See generally City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996)
(hereinafter "Albuquerque Il").
118. Id. at 423.
119. See id. at 424.
120. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M. 1993)
(hereinafter "Albuquerque n.
121. See id.
122. Id.
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ing a high arsenic content. l23 Since the aquifer is continually .
being depleted, the arsenic concentrations in Albuquerque's
water increase. l24 This increase results in elevated arsenic and
ammonia concentrations in the wastewater discharged from
Albuquerque's waste treatment facility into the Rio Grande. 125
When these elevated levels of pollutants flow downstream, they
affect the Isleta Pueblo's use of river water for ceremonial use
and crop irrigation purposes. 126
Albuquerque's waste treatment facility operates under an
EPA issued National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit. 127 Albuquerque's NPDES permit ensured
that it met the state of New Mexico's water quality standards. l28 In an attempt to obtain more control over the Rio
Grande River's water quality on the reservation, the Isleta
Pueblo applied for TAS status. On October 12, 1992, after the
thirty-day comment period, the EPA recognized the Isleta
Pueblo as a state for purposes of 33 u.s.c. § 1377(e).I29 This

123. See Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7
DUKE ENVI'L. L. & POL'Y F. 367, 381 n.79 (1997) (Janet Baker's personal
communication with EPA Office of Regional Counsel, Region VI, Dallas, Texas (October
1996».
124. See id. at 381 n.114.
125. See id.
126. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 428 (describing ceremonial uses to include
bathing and some possible ingestion of river water). See also http://www.Indianpueblo
.orglisleta.html. Agriculture is the principle occupation of the Isleta people. Thus,
water from the Rio Grande River is used for irrigation of food crops. See id.
127. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 419.
128. See id. Water Quality requirements under the CWA are implemented through
a permit process known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant, from a point source, into
the nation's waters except as approved through an NPDES permit. See 33 U.S.C. §
1311(a) (1994) ("except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317,1328,1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful"). Point source polluters are facilities, or specific locations, from
which water is discharged into any surface or subsurface drainage system. See 33
U.S.C. § 1362 (14) (1994) defining "Point source" as:
any discernable, confmed and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not
include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.
129. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 419, 426 (noting the City of Albuquerque
received a fun and fair opportunity for public notice, comment, and hearings under the
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allowed the Isleta Pueblo to promulgate their own water quality standards, which the EPA approved in December 1992.130
The Isleta Pueblo's standard for arsenic in the Rio Grande was
1,000 times more stringent than the federal Safe Drinking Water Standard, and was below the concentration that could accurately be measured by then existing laboratory equipment. 131
The Pueblo's standards were also more stringent than the
State of New Mexico's because their designated use of the water included primary contact ceremonial and recreational
uses. 132 While tribal members refused to describe the details of
ceremonial use, they defined "Primary Contact Ceremonial
Use" as ~e use of a stream, beach, lake, or impoundment for
religious or traditional purposes by members of the Pueblo of
Isleta; such use involves immersion and intentional or incidental ingestion ofwater."I33

On January 25, 1993, Albuquerque fIled a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to
challenge the EPA's approval of the Pueblo of Isleta tribe's water quality standards on several grounds. l34 One challenge was
procedural: Albuquerque asserted that the EPA failed to follow
the required procedures in approving the tribe's water quality
standards. l35 Two other challenges were substantive. First,
Albuquerque asserted that the EPA misinterpreted two provisions of the CWA 136 Second, Albuquerque claimed the EPA
approved standards that were unconstitutional. 137

APA and CWA). See supra note 4 and accompanying text for Clean Water Act 33
U.S.C. § 1377(e).
130. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
131. See id. at 742. See infra notes 141·145 and accompanying text.
132. See Albuquerque 1,865 F. Supp. at 736·740.
133. Albuquerque /I, 97 F.3d at 428.
134. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 736.
137. See id.
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1.
Albuquerque's Procedural Challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act
Albuquerque's procedural challenge asserted the EPA's decision to approve the Isleta Pueblo's TAS status was "arbitrary
and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).I38 Albuquerque claimed that the EPA's actions were
arbitrary and capricious because "compliance with nondetectable discharge limits would require reverse osmosis [a
treatment that reduces arsenic levels prior to discharge] with a
cost to the city of 248 million dollars in capital improvements
and 26 million dollars in annual operating costs. "i39 Albuquerque also alleged, under the APA, that the EPA should have rejected the Pueblo's water quality standards unless an independent EPA record found each particular provision sound
based on a rational basis standard. 140
The appellate court noted that the CWA permits "the EPA
and states to force technological advancement to attain higher
water quality."141 In its analysis, the district court looked to the
language of the CWA and determined that the EPA only reviews proposed water quality standards to determine if they
meet the minimum standards already required by the EPA 142
The EPA is not authorized to reject proposed standards because they are more stringent than the minimum federal requirements. l43 Thus, the district court found that although the

138. Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 737-739 (citing the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. §706(2)) which requires courts to determine whether the agency action
under review was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; ... without observance of procedure required by law; ... or
unsupported by substantial evidence," and Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado
Dept. of Social Services, 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 1991), which noted that the
arbitrary and capricious standard demands considerable deference to the agency
decisions and presumes the validity of the agency's action).
139. Baker, supra note 123, at 381 n.81 (quoting Petition for Certiorari, City of
Albuquerque v. Browner 20-21 (1997) unpublished court document on me with Janet
Baker).
140. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 426.
141. Id. (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 838 (7th Cir.
1977)).
142. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 741 (referring to 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.5;
131.11(a) (1992)).
143. See id. (citing 56 Fed.Reg. 64,886 (1991)).
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Tribe's arsenic standard was strict, the EPA lacked authority
to reject stringent standards on the grounds of harsh economic
or social effects. 144 Consequently, both the district and appellate court rejected plaintiffs argument that the EPA violated
the APA by forcing Albuquerque to implement innovative technology and expensive procedures to clean up its waste water. 145

2.
Albuquerque's Substantive Challenges to the EPA's
Actions

In its substantive arguments, Albuquerque claimed that the
EPA violated the CWA in two ways. 146 First, Albuquerque asserted that the EPA failed to create a procedure that resolved
disputes when a state and Tribe imposed different standards
on a common body of water. 147 A second, somewhat contradictory argument, was that the EPA had failed to ensure that the
Pueblo standards were stringent enough to protect the designated use for drinking water.l48
The district court rejected Albuquerque's first argument and
granted summary judgment to the EPA, fmding that the EPA
had followed the necessary procedures for accepting the
Pueblo's proposed water quality standards.149 The district court
found that the EPA's decisions were carefully made, with all
the relevant factors considered. l50 Albuquerque appealed the

144. See id. at 741 (citing Homestake Mining Co., v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283
(O.S.O. 1979».
145. See id. at 738. See also Albuquerque II, 97 F .3d at 426.
146. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 736.
147. See id. at 740. Albuquerque alleged that EPA's regulations were insufficient
because they allow only a state or tribe to initiate the resolution process and other
affected parties should also have this option to initiate the process. Id. Albuquerque
claimed that limiting this power to invoke violated the APA's requirement that an
established mechanism for resolving disputes be used when a state and a tribe impose
different water standards on the same body of water. Id. The Court rejected this
argument, finding the EPA's regulations were fair because only the tribes and states
may modifY the water quality standards in question. Id.
148. See id. (rmding Albuquerque's argument that the Tribe's water quality
standards were not safe enough under the Safe Drinking Water Act unpersuasive
because the Tribe's use was not for everyday drinking water).
149. See id. at 739,742 (rmding that the EPA abided by all the CWA's procedural
requirements and thereby fulfllied the purposes of the APA).
150. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 742. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text for factors.
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district court's decision, claiming that the CWA does not allow
tribes to establish water quality standards that are more stringent than federal standards and does not allow tribal standards to be enforced beyond reservation boundaries. 151 The
Tenth Circuit disagreed, affirmed the district court's holding,
and found that the EPA reasonably interpreted the CWA 152
Albuquerque's second argument, that the Pueblo's water
quality standards were not strict enough under the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), was also unpersuasive to the district COurt. l53 Albuquerque claimed that the Pueblo's standards
were not stringent enough to protect people who came into contact with the water during ceremonial or recreational use. 154
Because some ceremonial use might involve ingestion of the
river water, Albuquerque argued that the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(0, should apply.l55 The district court rejected this argument, calling it "far-fetched," because the
SDWA was intended to protect people who ingest water on a
daily basis. l56 The court found this statute inapplicable in the
immediate case because water would only be ingested during
periodic ceremonial or recreational use. 157
B.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS WAS ACCURATE AND ITS
FINDINGS WERE PROPER UNDER THE CWA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings and held that Indian tribes
may exercise "their inherent sovereign power to impose standards or limits that are more stringent than those imposed by
the federal government. "158
In addressing Albuquerque's
charge that the EPA interpreted the CWA incorrectly, the
Tenth Circuit approached the case in two ways. 159 First, the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421 (referring to 33 U .S.C. § 1377 (1996».
See id. at 429.
See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 740.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 740.
Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423.
See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421-423.
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court applied the two-step "Chevron test" established by the
United States Supreme Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council. l60 The Court created the Chevron
test to guide judicial review of agency interpretations of acts of
Congress. 161 The appellate court applied this test to determine
whether the EPA violated its regulatory authority under the
CWA 162 The second part of the Albuquerque court's analysis
focused on the purpose of the CWA as a whole in order to determine whether the EPA had overstepped its authority in
granting TAS status to the Pueblo Tribe. 163
The appellate court's analysis relied, in part, on traditional
notions of federal preemption and inherent tribal sovereignty.lM The court found that the Pueblo Tribe was allowed to
set more stringent water quality standards, "absent an express
statutory elimination of those powers."l65 The court ultimately
held that the EPA has authority to require upstream NPDES
dischargers to comply with stricter downstream tribal standards; that the EPA's approval of the ceremonial use standard
in connection with approval of tribal standards did not violate
the establishment clause; and the tribal standards were not
unconstitutionally vague. 166

1.

Stricter Tribal Water Quality Standards

The Tenth Circuit applied the two-step Chevron test to determine whether the EPA's approval of the Pueblo Tribe's more
stringent water quality standards was permissible. 167 The first

160. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984). See infra notes 167-182 and accompanying text.
161. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
162. See Albuquerque Il, 97 F.3d at 422.
163. See id. at 422-423 (noting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and Congress's objective in the
Clean Water Act to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters"). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Congress designed the
Clean Water Act to provide for a comprehensive regulatory scheme that recognized and
preserved a primary role to the states in eliminating pollution from the nation's
waterways. See id.
164. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 429. See infra notes 182, 189-190 and accompanying text.
167. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421.
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part of the Chevron test requires the reviewing court to determine whether congressional intent is clear and unambiguous
regarding the specific question at issue. l68 When congressional
intent is clear, the second part of the test need not be applied. 169 .
However, if congressional intent is unclear, regarding the specific issue, courts must apply the second part of the Chevron
test, which is an analysis of whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 170
Under the first part of the test, the Albuquerque court examined Congress's intent and questioned whether it was clear
regarding a Tribe's power to set more stringent standards. 171
The court found Congress's intent unclear because CWA section 1377(e), which authorizes the Administrator to treat qualifying Tribes as states, did not expressly incorporate section
1370, which allows states to· adopt more stringent water quality standards than other states or the EPA 172 Instead, the
court reli~d on the EPA's argument that section 1370 is a
"savings clause that merely recognizes powers already held by
the states.»l73 Thus, the court found that Indian tribes may
exercise their inherent sovereign power to establish limits that
are more stringent than states or the federal government when
there is no express statutory elimination of those powers. 174
Since the Albuquerque court did not find express statutory
limits on these powers, it determined that congressional intent

168. See Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842·843.
169. See Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 422.
170. See Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842·843.
171. See Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 422.
172. See id. at 423. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) specifically includes 33 U.S.C. Sections
1254. 1256. 1313. 1315. 1318. 1319. 1324. 1329. 1341. 1342. and 1344. The court
refused to find clear Congressional intent because § 1370 was not expressly listed in §
1377(e). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
173. Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 423. The COU!t agreed with the EPA's argument
that 33 U.S.C. § 1370 is a "savings clause" that reiterates rights already held by states.
For instance. states already have the right to exercise their sovereign power to set
water standards or limits that are more stringent than those imposed by the federal
government. Thus. tribes with state status may also exercise these powers. See id.
174. See id. (citing United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313. 323 (1978) (rmding that
Indian tribes could use their water rights. which are an element of tribal sovereignty.
to assert an action against upstream polluters to recover damages for groundwater
contamination).
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was ambiguous. 175 Thus, the court proceeded to the second part
of the Chevron Test in its attempt to determine whether the
EPA had exceeded its authority in interpreting the CWA 176
In the second part of the Chevron Test, the Albuquerque
court questioned whether the EPA's approval of the more
stringent Pueblo standards was based on a permissible construction of the CWA 177 In making its determination, the court
gave deference to the EPA's interpretation of the CWA because
the EPA is charged with administering the Act. 178 The court
rejected Albuquerque's argument that the EPA misinterpreted
the CWA because section 1377 (empowering the EPA to treat
tribes as states) does not expressly permit tribes to enforce
standards under section 1311 (prohibiting the discharge of any
pollutant) upon upstream, off-reservation, point source polluters.179 Instead, the court reasoned that because section 1377{e)
incorporates sections 1341 and 1342 (giving the EPA authority
to issue NPDES permits in compliance with tribal water quality standards), the 1987 amendment to the CWA clearly provides tribes with the authority to establish NPDES permit requirements with the EPA ISO It is the EPA, rather than the
tribe, that uses the NPDES permit system against upstream
polluters to enforce the downstream Pueblo tribe's water quality standards. 181 Consequently, the court found that the EPA's
construction of the Act {that tribes may promulgate water

175. See id. at 422.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 422 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 V.S. 91,
112 (1992), which criticized the Tenth Circuit for failing to give the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Water Act "an appropriate level of deference n ).
179. See id. at 423. The court found that Albuquerque misconstrued the CWA by
selectively reading sections rather than the act as a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
180. See id. at 423-424. See also 33 V.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994), providing in part
that:
any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which
may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the
discharge originates or will originate ... that any such discharge will comply
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of
this title.
181. See id. at 424 (reasoning that since the EPA would be enforcing the Tribe's
water quality standards, the Tribe did not exceed the scope of its jurisdiction over
nonmembers by reaching beyond the boundaries of the reservation).
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quality standards more stringent than those imposed by the
federal government) was in accordance with the powers of inherent Indian tribal sovereignty. 182

2.
EPA's Enforcement of Tribal Water Quality Standards
Upon Upstream Polluters
The second question the Tenth Circuit addressed was
whether section 1377 of the Clean Water Act allowed Indian
tribes to enforce their standards upon upstream point source
dischargers outside the reservation boundaries. l83 The court
held that, under the CWA, tribes are not enforcing their water
quality standards beyond reservation boundaries. l84 Instead,
the EPA is exercising its own authority to require upstream
NPDES discharges to comply with downstream tribal standards through the NPDES permit system. l85 The court also
acknowledged that tribes may have jurisdiction 'over nonIndian conduct that has some direct effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe. l86 This "health and welfare" theory, first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States,
asserts that tribes may have inherent jurisdiction over nonIndian resources if there is "some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."187 Nevertheless, the court avoided reliance on this less
utilized "health and welfare" exception by fmding that it was
the EPA, rather than the tribe, who would enforce more stringent tribal water quality standards upon off-reservation, nonIndian parties. 188
Albuquerque's constitutional challenges

182. See id. at 423.
183. See id. at 423-424.
184. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 424:
185. See id. (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992) (holding that
the EPA's requirement that NPDES dischargers must comply with the downstream
State's water quality standards was a reasonable exercise of the agency's statutory
discretion pursuant to §§ 1341, 1342).
186. Id. at 424 n.14 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (rmding
that tribes have inherent jurisdiction over non-Indian conduct or non-Indian resources
if there is "some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare ofthe tribe").
187. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
188. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 424. The court found a stronger basis for the
Albuquerque decision by relying on Congress's delegation of power to the EPA rather
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based on First Amendment violations 189 and vagueness l90 were
also defeated by the appellate court.

than the less utilized Montana exception, apparently because the Montana court
limited inherent sovereign authority to non-Indian conduct on non-Indian fee lands
within a reservation when it threatens the political integrity, economic security or
health or welfare of the tribe. [d.
189. See id. at 428429. Albuquerque alleged that because the Pueblo's water
quality standards included "Primary Contact Ceremonial Use" for religious purposes
by members of the Tribe, the EPA's approval violated the Establishment Clause. The
First Amendment provides that ·Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." [d. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). The court rejected this
claim, noting that government action does not violate the Establishment Clause if "the
challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or
pnn:;ary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion." [d. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)).
Albuquerque used the Establishment Clause to challenge the ceremonial use
standard in three ways. First, Albuquerque claimed that the reason for the designated
use was explicitly sectarian. The court disagreed and found that the EPA's purpose in
approving the designated use had a clear secular purpose, namely to promote the goals
of the Clean Water Act. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 428-429. EPA's approval of the
Tribe's standards did not violate the Establishment clause because EPA's purpose in
approving the Tribe's designated use was unrelated to the Pueblo's religious reasons
for establishing it. [d. Second, Albuquerque argued that the EPA's action had the
primary effect of advancing the Pueblo's religion because it created and maintained
conditions that furthered the practice of the religion by requiring sufficient water
quality standards. The court also rejected this argument, rmding that the primary
effect of the EPA's action was to advance the goals of the CWA, with any benefits the
Pueblo received to their religion incidental. In fact, the court stated that: "the agency's
approval furthers the free exercise of religion, consistent with the policy expressed in
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act." [d. at 429 n.20. The Act provides that
"It shall be the policy ofthe United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions
of the American Indian ... including but not limited to ... freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites." [d. at 429 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 1994)).
Finally, Albuquerque claimed that the EPA's approval of the designated ceremonial
use results in excessive governmental entanglement with religion because the tribe
and the EPA would have to consistently check with each other to see whether the
standards adequately protected religious use of the river water. The court found
instead that the EPA's approval of the standard did not require governmental
involvement in the Pueblo's religious practices because the EPA simply incorporated
the Pueblo's standards into the issuance of future NPDES permits. Thus, the court
found that the EPA's purpose in approving the tribe's water quality standards was to
promote the goals of the CWA and not the Tribe's religion. [d. at 428-429.
190. See id. at 429. Albuquerque alleged that the Pueblo's water quality standards
were unconstitutionally vague, thereby depriving them of their due process rights,
because they were set in narrative terms prohibiting "'floating materials,'
'contaminants [whichl .. .impart unpalatable flavor of fish,' 'nutrients [whichl produce
objectionable algal densities,' 'waters [which arel ... virtually free of pathogens.'" [d.
(quoting Appellant's Br. at 48-49). The court found "a strong presumption that
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The Albuquerque court ultimately upheld the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, it's underlying congressional intent, and
the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty upon which it based
the decision to grant TAS status to the Isleta Pueblo tribe. 191
Albuquerque's subsequent petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied without comment. l92
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN ALBUQUERQUE v.
BROWNER IS SOUND AND THE REASONING SHOULD BE
FOLLOWED BY OTHER COURTS WHEN EVALUATING
EPA APPROVAL AND ENFORCEMENT OF DOWNSTREAM
TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
Because water flows through borders, the ongoing debate in
this area of law concerns the scope of Indian tribal authority to
affect non-Indian activities on non-Indian lands located both
within and upstream from reservation boundaries. l93 This dispute is not about the technical content of approved water quality standards, but rather involves the power struggle between
tribes, states, and the federal government to promulgate their
own water quality standards even if each has significant impacts on the other respective jurisdictions.

regulations are not unconstitutionally vague if the regulated party has the means of
obtaining clarification either by making inquiry or through an administrative process."
Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)). The test is
whether a regulation puts a party on notice as to what conduct is required. Thus,
Albuquerque's claim of vagueness was without merit since the administrative
procedure in place gave Albuquerque notice of the specific enforceable standards that it
must meet. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429.
191. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429.
192. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 118 S.·Ct. 410 (November 10, 1997).
193. See generally Denise D. Fort, State and Tribal Water Quality Standards
Under the Clean Water Act: A Case Study, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 771 (Fall, 1995). See
also Daniel l.S.J. Rey·Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: Legal
Bases For Regulatory Authority Over Non·Indian Reservation Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 151,217·218 (1995·1996).
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A

THE ALBUQUERQUE COURTS REASONING STRENGTHENED
TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

The Albuquerque court's decision strengthened the notion of
inherent tribal sovereignty in two ways. First, by adopting the
EPA's interpretation of the CWA that tribes may set more
stringent water quality standards under section 1370, the Albuquerque court recognized that tribes, like states, retain their
inherent sovereign powers unless expressly eliminated by Congress. l94 This notion, established in cases like Williams v. Lee,
protects the authority of Indian governments to regulate their
reservations. 195
Second, the Court recognized the Montana v. United States
public health and welfare exception; that tribes may exercise
civil jurisdiction over Don-Indian·conduct on fee land within a
reservation when that conduct has some direct effect on the
health and welfare of the tribe. The Albuquerque court's recognition of the validity of the Montana exception offered support to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Montana v. EPA, 196 where
it confronted the issue of enforcement of tribal water quality
standards on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation. l97
B.

THE ALBUQUERQUE COURTS ANALYSIS REGARDING
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY WAS CORRECT, As EVIDENCED
By MONTANA V. EPA

The Albuquerque court's opinion was recently cited favora,.
bly by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Montana v. EPA, in which the court upheld the EPA's grant
of TAS status to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation}98 Now, two circuit court opinions

194. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 at 423 (lOth Cir. 1996)
(hereinafter "Albuquerque II").
195. See infra notes 48·50 and accompanying text.
196. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
197. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998).
198. See id. The Court noted that: "Our decision is also fully consistent with the
only other circuit opinion that has yet considered the issue of tribal authority to set
water quality standards." Id. at 1141. (citing City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d
415 (lOth Cir. 1996». The Ninth Circuit opinion remains good law as the United
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are in accord regarding the issue of tribal authority to set water quality standards}99 Montana v. EPA illustrates the expansion upon the Albuquerque court's holding that the EPA is
authorized to treat eligible Indian tribes in the same manner
as states, thereby allowing the EPA to enforce more stringent
downstream tribal water quality standards upon upstream
polluters. 200
In Montana v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit logically expanded
the Albuquerque court's reasoning to include the enforcement
of tribal water quality standards on non-members located on
fee land within reservation boundaries. 201 If the Ninth Circuit
in Montana had instead found that tribes possessed inherent
authority to establish water quality standards for tribal and
Indian trust lands only, NPDES permits for point source polluters on non-Indian lands within the reservation's watershed
would still require compliance with downstream tribal water
quality standards pursuant to Albuquerque, and the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma:J.02
Thus, there is little difference between forcing non-Indian, oft'. reservation, polluters to comply indirectly with downstream
tribal water quality standards and forcing non-Indian, reservation polluters to comply directly with such standards. 203
At issue in Montana v. EPA was whether the EPA's regulations granting TAS status to the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes on the Flathead Reservation allowed the tribes
to exceed the permissible scope of their authority over nonmembers living within the reservation on fee land.204 The

States Supreme Court recently denied Montana's writ for certiorari without comment.
See Montana v. EPA, 119 S. Ct. 275 (October 5, 1998).
199. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th
Cir. 1998).
200. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429.
201. See id. at 423. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1142.
202. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106 (holding that Arkansas must
comply with downstream Oklahoma's water quality standards). See also Albuquerque
II, 97 F.3d at 423.
203. See Rey-Bear, supra note 193, at 212.
204. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138 (claiming that the EPA regulations
permitting tribes to be treated as states for the purpose of setting their own water
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Ninth Circuit found that the EPA's regulations were valid and
reflected the "appropriate delineation and application of inherent tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting nonmembers. "205

1.

Facts and Procedural History of Montana v. EPA

The Flathead Indian Reservation encompasses roughly 1.2
million acres and contains 4,000 natural stream miles.206 In
1992, the Tribes were granted TAS status over all surface waters within the reservation.207 The Flathead Reservation's
dominant feature is Flathead Lake, which provides water for
domestic, industrial, and agricultural uses within the reservation.208 The land within the reservation reflects a checkerboard
pattern of ownership between tribal and non-tribal entities. 209
The non-tribal entities include the state, county, and municipalities that operate discharge waste facilities into reservation
waters pursuant to existing NPDES permitS. 210
In their application for TAS status, the Tribes identified
several facilities located on non-Indian fee lands within the
reservation that threatened the impairment of the reservation's water quality.211 Potential point source polluters included private and government operated slaughterhouses, hydroelectric facilities, wood processing plants, and three wastewater treatment plants. 212 Additional reservation commercial
activities included feedlots, mine tailings, dumps, landfills, and
auto wrecking yards. 213 The Tribes submitted a detailed map
with their TAS application, illustrating that all lands located

quality standards allowed the tribes to exert authority over non-members that
exceeded the inherent tribal powers recognized as necessary for tribal self-governance).
205. [d. at 114l.
206. See Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 948 n.5 (D. Mont. 1996).
207. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1139.
211. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139-1140.
212. See id. at 1140.
213. See id.
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within the reservation's boundaries drain into the Tribes'
Lower Flathead River.214
The plaintiffs (hereinafter "Montana") included state and
municipal entities that own fee land on the reservation. 215 The
defendants included the EPA and the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes. 216 Montana opposed the Tribes TAS application stating that, if granted, the regulations would permit the
Tribes to exercise excessive authority over non-members that
was broader than necessary for tribal self-governance. 217 The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants
and the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed. 218

2.

The Ninth Circuit Court's Analysis

The issue in Montana was whether the EPA violated section
1377(e) of the CWA, which requires the EPA to develop and
implement regulations that enumerate how Indian tribes shall
be treated as states for purposes of section 1377(e).219 The EPA
had determined that the Tribes should be authorized to establish water quality standards for non-Indian fee lands as well as
Indian lands within the reservation, based on the EPA's determination that water pollution from non-member activities
on non-Indian lands would have serious and substantial impacts on the health and welfare of the Tribes.22O Montana argued that the EPA's regulations permitted the Tribes to exceed
their inherent tribal sovereignty to impermissibly exercise jurisdictional authority over non-members.221 The court held that
the EPA's regulations providing TAS status to the Tribes was
valid and reflected the appropriate delineation and application

214. See Rey-Bear, supra note 193, at 207.
215. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. at 958. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d
at 1142.
219. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138.
220. See id. at 1139.
221. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138. Petitioners argued that the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),
prevented tribes from exercising authority over nonmember activities on fee lands
within the reservation. [d.
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of inherent tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting
non-members.222

In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit fIrst looked to the CWA
and the TAS provisions. 223 The court then examined the EPA's
regulations at issue and found the EPA's third requirement,
that a tribe's water quality standards program must pertain to
the ·protection of waters within the reservation, to be of particular importance because it intended to reflect the scope of a
tribe's inherent sovereign powers.224 To determine if the Tribes
could exercise authority over the activities of the non-member
plaintiffs on non-Indian fee lands, the court relied on the public
health and welfare exception articulated in Montana v. United
States, which the EPA adopted into its regulations.225 The
Montana exception and EPA rules require tribes to show that
the regulated activity affects "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe," and that
the impact on the tribe is "serious and substantial."226 Under
the EPA's Final Rules, this determination is made on a caseby-case basis, based in part on the tribe's scope of inherent
authority and the EPA's generalized fmdings that water quality and human health are closely linked. 227

222. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140·1141.
223. See id. at 1138·39 (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 33 U.S.C. § 1342; 33 U.S.C. §
1377(e». See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
224. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139 (citing 40 C.F.R. 131.8(a)(1)-(4) (1998».
EPA regulations require: "(1) the tribe must be federally recognized and exercising
governmental authority; (2) the tribe must have a governing body carrying out
'substantial governmental duties and powers'; (3) the water quality standards program
which the tribe seeks to administer must 'pertain to the management and protection of
water resources: which are 'within the borders of an lndian reservation'; (4) the Indian
tribe is reasonably expected to be capable of carrying out the functions of an effective
water quality standards program in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes
of the Clean Water Act and regulations").
225. See id. at 1139 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981),
and EPA's Final Rule codified at 56 Fed. Reg. at 64, 877-78». The EPA adopted the
Montana exception by requiring a Tribe to show that the regulated activities affect "the
political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe," and the
potential impacts must be ~serious and substantial." Montana, 137 F.3d. at 1139.
226. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566. See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(3).
227. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131(b)(3) requiring
tribes to assert that: (1) there are waters within the reservation used by the tribe, (2)
the waters and critical habitat are subject to protection under the CWA, and (3)
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In analyzing the facts of the case, the court first noted the
general rule established in Montana v. United States that Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty.22B However,
the court found the second Montana exception applicable to
this case, despite some precedent that cast doubt on its viability.229 The court cited Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton230
to support its finding that the powers of inherent tribal sovereignty may be invoked by tribes to exercise civil authority over
non-Indian conduct on fee lands on the reservation when that
conduct threatens the health and welfare of the tribe. 231 Colville also supported the EPA's generalized findings that, due to
the mobile nature of contaminates in surface water, it would be
impracticable to separate the effects of water quality impairment on non-Indian fee land from impairment on tribal portions of reservation land. 232 The court thereby upheld the
EPA's previous decision, finding that the activities of the nonmembers on the Flathead Reservation posed a serious and substantial threat to the Tribes' health and welfare, thereby requiring tribal regulation.233

impairment of waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and
welfare of the tribe).
228. See id. at 1140.
229. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140-1141. The court noted that while the
United States Supreme Court disagreed in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), about how to apply the second
Montana exception, the m~ority nonetheless agreed that it controlled. The Ninth
Circuit then found that the Court reaffirmed the Montana exception in State v. A-I
Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997), which found that the Montana exception
applies if there is a nexus between the regulated activity and tribal self-governance.
Id.
230. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
231. See id. at 1141 (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,
52-54 (9th Cir. 1981). In Colville, the Ninth Circuit held, in part, that the State of
Washington's potential authority to regulate a watershed located entirely within the
Colville Reservation was preempted by federal creation of the Reservation, thereby
leaving regulatory jurisdiction to the tribe and federal government. Montana v. EPA,
137 F.3d at 1141.
232. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1141 (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (1981), noting that a water system is a unitary resource so that
the actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on other users).
233. See id.
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Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the scope of inherent
tribal authority was a question of law for the courts, not the
EPA, it nonetheless upheld the EPA's regulations as an appropriate interpretation of inherent tribal regulatory authority. 234
Montana v. EPA reaffIrmed the Albuquerque court's conclusion
that the EPA reasonably construed and applied the CWA by'
finding the EPA's regulations were in accord with Congressional intent and inherent tribal sovereignty.235 Although the
issues were not exactly the same in Albuquerque and Montana,
the courts used similar legal reasoning in reaching their decisions by looking to the plain language of the CWA and the intent of Congress to fmd that tribes may be treated as states,
having the ability to set more stringent water quality standards than the federal government.236 The decisions issued by
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits were logical and fully consistent
with each other because they strengthened the purpose and
intent of the CWA to provide tribal governments with the
power to exercise authority over "water resources held by the
tribe, or by members, or over water resources otherwise within
the borders of an Indian reservation. »237

v. OTHER COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE DECISIONS SET FORTH IN ALBUQUERQUE v. BROWNER AND
MONTANA v. EPA BECAUSE TRIBAL WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS ARE LIKELY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND WELFARE OF TRIBES
As a result of applying ideas of tribal sovereignty to intergovernmental relationships with tribes, the EPA became the
first federal agency to recognize and incorporate concepts of
inherent tribal sovereignty into its regulatory policie~. Specifi-

234. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140 (citing Chevron U.s.A. Inc., v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 834-44 (1984), which found that while
the EPA may not determine the scope of inherent tribal authority, its decision to adopt
the standard of inherent tribal authority as the standard intended by Congress may be,
given deference because the CWA's language and legislative history were not entirely
clear).
235. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,
Montana v. EPA, at 18 (1999) (unpublished court document on file with author).
236. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 418-419. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at
1138-1139.
237. 33 U.s.C. § 1377(e)(2).
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cally, states with federally recognized tribes may find themselves having to abide by EPA-approved standards that are
more stringent than the state or federal government's standards. These regulations, which uphold and apply higher levels of water quality standards over jurisdictions sharing a
common water source, should continue to be upheld because a
water system is a unitary resource and the actions of one user
often have an immediate effect on other users. 238

A

A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN LAw
THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN THE CWA

Traditional principals of federal Indian law begin with a
broad inquiry into concepts of self-government and existing
federal policies that promote tribal self-sufficiency.239 Although
considerations of tribal sovereignty do not control over jurisdictional issues, sovereignty considerations are nonetheless important because they help protect against state encroachment
by creating a presumption of federal preemption. 240
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have logically approved the
EPA's test that, when considering whether tribes should be
granted TAB status for purposes of setting water quality standards for waters that flow through or adjacent to fee lands on a
reservation, the EPA will look to the facts of the case and
whether the activities of non-members have "serious and substantial" effects "on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. "241 In order to comport with Supreme Court precedent, the EPA carefully crafted
its regulations to require that a tribe's inherent authority must

238. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981).
239. See generally Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the
Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State
Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989) (analyzing the delegation of environmental
program authority to tribes).
240. See generally David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1620
(December, 1996).
241. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,
Montana v. EPA, at 11 (1999) (quoting Pet. App. 63a) (unpublished court document on
file with author).
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be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering whether
the non-member activities posed a serious and substantial risk
to the tribe's welfare. 242 The EPA found the tribes in Albuquerque and Montana faced substantial risks from water pollution
based on the detailed evidence provided by the tribes in their
applications. 243
While these decisions were made on a case-by-case basis,
tribes are again being viewed by the courts as retaining inherent sovereign authority not otherwise "ceded by treaty, excised
by federal legislation, or diverted by the courts. "244 The plain
language of the CWA further strengthens the Albuquerque and
Montana courts' decisions because it lacks language that diminishes tribal regulatory authority. 245 Instead, the CWA reflects Congress' intent to authorize the EPA to treat qualified
tribes in the same manner as states. Section 1377(e)(2) provides that Indian tribes may receive TAS status not only with
respect to land held by or on behalf of the tribe or its members,
but also with respect to land that is otherwise within the borders of a tribe's "reservation."246 Section 1377(h) dermes the
term "Federal Indian reservation" as "all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government. "247 This definition is analogous to the description of a reservation as "Indian country," which the Supreme Court has consistently held, prior to the enactment of
section 1377 in 1987, to include "lands held in fee by nonIndians within reservation boundaries. "246 Thus, the plain language of the CWA precludes states like New Mexico and Mon-

242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. See also Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
243. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (1Oth Cir. 1998) (hereinafter
"Albuquerque II"). See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
244. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes
possess those parts of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication
as a necessary result of their dependent status).
245. See generally CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 et. seq. (1994).
246. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2). See also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
247. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h) (1994).
248. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,
Montana v. EPA, at 13 n.3 (1999) (unpublished court document on fIle with author)
(citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984».
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tana from arguing that the EPA is barred from treating tribes
as states with respect to reservation lands owned in fee by nonIndians. 249
The reasoning of Albuquerque and Montana should be followed by subsequent courts when addressing similar issues.
Tribes must be able to set requirements on the quality of waters that enter their reservations from outside sources in order
to properly regulate the quality of water that flows through
their lands.250 Similarly, tribes with checkerboard land ownership on their reservations, including Indian trust lands and
non-Indian fee lands, must also be able to assert full, uniform
jurisdiction over water quality standards in order to protect the
health and welfare of the tribe. 251 As previously mentioned,
this is especially true considering that upstream reservation
polluters would have to comply with downstream water quality
standards anyway.252 Thus, if Montana's health and welfare
exception has any real validity, it must provide for the protection and promotion of clean water on all reservation lands
through the regulation of all sources of water pollution.
B.

FUTURE CHALLENGES TO MORE STRINGENT TRIBAL
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS MUST BE FACT SPECIFIC TO
SUCCEED

It is settled law that the EPA's construction of the CWA, regarding treating Indian tribes as states, and its subsequent
agency regulations, are constitutional and in accord with the
intent of Congress.253 Future challenges to more stringent
tribal water quality standards must be fact specific to distinguish the cases at hand and be successful. In Montana v. EPA,
the State did not challenge the EPA's factual findings that deg-

249. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
250. See DanielI.S.J. Hey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute:
Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indian Reseroatwn Lands, 20
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 213 (1995-1996).
251. See id.
252. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
91, 101 (1992).
253. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 415. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at
1141.
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radation of the reservation's waters would have a serious and
substantial impact on the Tribes.254 Thus, the court reviewed
only the challenges under the APA, in which it gave the EPA
deference. 255 Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have found the
EPA's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the CWA
reasonable with regard to inherent tribal authority over nonmembers in promulgating their own water quality standards. 256
Future courts should continue to follow this sound precedent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment focused on the TAS provisions provided by
the EPA to qualifying tribes under the CWA in the two recent
circuit court opinions of City of Albuquerque v. Browner and
Montana v. EPA. While the CWA's TAS provisions may logically be justified under both federal preemption and sovereignty analyses, courts should continue to recognize tribal sovereignty as the determining factor. The argument for inherent
tribal authority is important because "in every instance where
tribes, with inherent powers to act, act instead under a delegation of federal authority, the perception of inherent tribal
authority is diminished. "257 As long as courts continue to use
non-Indian interests or federal authority as the determining
factors, sovereignty issues will become even more obscured.
Because tribes are sovereign entities, non-Indians choosing
to live or do business on reservations must realize the likelihood of being subject to tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction if
their activities have a serious and substantial impact on the
health, safety and welfare of the tribe.258 Although the EPA
makes a case-specific determination for each tribe, it has also
made generalized findings that there is a close relationship
between water quality and the public's health and welfare. 259
Thus, the EPA should presumptively accept tribal assertions of

254. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,
Montana v. EPA, at 12 n.l (1999) (unpublished court document on me with author).
255. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 114l.
256. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 415; Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 114l.
257. Royster & Fausett, supra note 239, at 597.
258. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878.
259. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL'INDIAN LAw at 625 (4TH ed.1998).
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the effects on health and welfare unless rebutted by opposing
parties.260
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